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MR. JUSTICE POWELL AND THE 
EMERGING NIXON MAJORITY 
A. E. Dick Howard* 
I N recent years, we have come to expect the debate over Supreme Court nominations to reflect ideological passions in the Govern-
ment and the country at large; the Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell 
cases remain fresh in memory. In the hearings on the nominations of 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to the Court, Senate 
Democratic liberals made clear their intention to probe not only the 
nominees' integrity and legal qualifications, but also their judicial 
philosophies. It was ironic, therefore, to watch as liberal members of 
the Judiciary Committee, through their questions and comments at 
the confirmation hearings, made Powell, the conservative appointee 
of a Republican President, look even larger than life.1 
Powell's credentials, of course, were remarkable to begin with; 
they included the presidency of the American Bar Association and of 
the American College of Trial Lawyers, as well as other signal honors. 
But he was also the beneficiary of being paired with another nominee 
who, as events would have it, became the prime object of the liberals' 
attack. It was never likely that either nominee would be defeated, 
but liberal hopes burned more brightly in seeking to block Rehn-
quist, whose political activism presented readier targets, than the 
more prudent and circumspect Powell. Indeed, the close observer of 
the Senate's consideration of the two nominees would have to con-
clude that from the beginning not only was there no particular in-
terest in an effort to "get" Powell, but also that Senate liberals set 
out to highlight the contrasts between Rehnquist and Powell. As a 
result, the public record, as made out during the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings, is largely one of encomiums for Lewis Powell. 
That record, therefore, does not yield much analysis of Powell's likely 
behavior on the bench. 
• Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1954, University of Richmond; B.A. 
1960, M.A. 1965, Oxford University; LL.B. 1961, University of Virginia.-Ed. 
l. See, e.g., Senator Bayh's introduction into the record of the highly favorable letter 
from Jean Camper Cahn referred to in note 82 infra, and Senator Tunney's conclusion 
that at the hearings Powell had shown himself to be "a man of brilliance, compassion, 
and imagination." Hearings on Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United Stales Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 280, 
287 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings]. See also the favorable views of Senators Bayh, Hart, 
Kennedy, and Tunney in their statements of individual views. SENATE COMM. oN THE 
JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., ExEc. REP. No. 92-17, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1971). 
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What may we expect of Mr. Justice Powell? Judges are regularly 
admonished-frequently by their own colleagues-to lay aside their 
social and economic views when interpreting the Constitution. Just 
as regularly, nominees to the Court say that they will strive to do just 
that.2 But we are too much the children of twentieth-century insights 
into psychology and behavior to escape the implications of Judge 
Jerome Frank's comment, "When I woke up one morning a federal 
court judge, I found myself about the same person who had gone to 
bed the night before an S.E.C. Commissioner."3 
It is natural, then, though far from the whole story, to ask some-
thing of what Powell has been-his law practice, his social and eco-
nomic status, his whole life style-in pondering the kind of Justice he 
may be. John Schmidhauser, in an exhaustive "collective portrait" 
of the Supreme Court, described the typical Justice as "white, gen-
erally Protestant with a penchant for a high social status denomina-
tion, usually of ethnic stock originating in the British Isles, and born 
_in comfortable circumstances in an urban or small town environ-
ment."4 To these characteristics are added other factors such as 
educational and social opportunities. 5 
Powell has had the economic and social advantages to which 
Schmidhauser refers, but such factors are so generalized as to be of 
little value in describing a man's philosophy. Arguably more relevant 
would be the new Justice's professional career, a more focused ex-
perience. Senator Harris, the only Senator to vote against Powell's 
confirmation, thought it significant that Powell was an eminently 
successful corporate lawyer among whose clients were numbered 
some of the wealthier and more influential corporations in the coun-
try. In Harris' view a man who had moved among "the rich, the 
comfortable, the approved" could not be expected to understand the 
plight of the common man in deciding Supreme Court cases.0 
We should be wary of supposing that one who has been a corpo-
rate lawyer will behave in any particular way on the bench. As Paul 
Freund has noted, the Court's history cautions against the generali-
2. See, e.g., the colloquy between Rehnquist and Senator McClellan in Hearings, 
supra note 1, at 18-19. 
3. Quoted in A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROIII TAFr TO WARREN 192 (1958). 
4. Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 MID• 
WEST]. POL. SCI. 1, 45 (1959). 
5. Id. 
6. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 7, 1971, at I, col. I. The history to 1954 of 
Powell's law firm is documented in 1 T. GAY, THE HUNTON WILLIAMS FIRM AND ITS 
PREDECESSORS 1877-1954 (1971). The book's chapter headings-e.g., "Public Service Cor-
porations,'' "Railroad and Corporate. Reorganizations," "The Petroleum Industry"-
are strongly suggestive of the nature of the firm's practice. 
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zation that "the la'wyer is father to the judge."7 One might recall, for 
example, the libertarian opinions of Charles Evans Hughes as a re-
joinder to predictions grounded in economic determinism.8 Lewis 
Powell, like any other appointee, will bring with him to the Court 
the fruits of his professional career, but like others before him he will 
be subject to moulding forces that he would not have encountered in 
practice-notably the traditions of the Court9 and the interactions 
among the Justices themselves.10 
Prediction, then, is risky business. But most men who have at-
tained the eminence of the Supreme Court have, along the way, left 
ample evidence of their attitudes and philosophy-evidence that may 
be suggestive of future judicial tendencies. Powell is no exception. 
For insights, there are several sources to which we may turn: Pow-
ell's own speeches and writings, which have been fairly ample; his 
career of public service, which has reached into a number of areas; 
and what others have said about Powell. To this record, one should 
add the perspective of President Nixon's expectations of his nominees_ 
-the articulated premises on which the appointment was made. 
In announcing the Powell and Rehnquist nominations, Mr. 
Nixon saw himself as redeeming a campaign pledge to put "judicial 
conservatives" on the Court.11 The President, in his statement, 
sought to distinguish bet1veen "judicial" and "political" philosophy, 
but, as Alan Dershowitz has pointed out, 12 his definitions seem not to 
have been the traditional ones. While no clean line can be drawn be-
tween "judicial" and "political" philosophy-both, after all, require 
the making of value judgments about political institutions-a judi-
7. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 116 (1961). As support for 
such a conclusion, note the findings of John Schmidhauser that, contrary to a com-
monly held assumption, Supreme Court Justices who have been corporation lawyers are 
no more likely than Justices of other backgrounds to adhere to stare decisis. Schmid-
hauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the Justices of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 194, 204 (1961). 
B. See Hendel, Charles Evans Hughes, in 3 THE JumCES OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, 1893, 1904-05 (L. Friedman &: F. Israel ed. 1969) [hereinafter 
Friedman &: Israel]. After an overdose of behaviorism and economic determinism, both 
legal and historic studies have, in recent years, seen a renewed interest in the study of 
ideas in their own right. See, e.g., Greene, The Flight from Determinism: A Review of 
Recent Literature on the Coming of the American Revolution, 61 SOUTH ATLANTIC Q. 
235, 257 (1962); Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. &: 
MARY Q,, Jan. 1966, at 3. 
9. Even those who, before becoming Justices, have served on some other bench find 
that the Supreme Court is, as Frankfurter once put it, "a very special kind of court." 
F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE&: OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER 83 (1965). 
IO. See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Murphy, Courts as Small 
Groups, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1565 (1966). 
II. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. l. 
12. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1971, § 4, at l; col. 5. 
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ciary philosophy deals more specifically with the Court's processes 
(e.g., the weight to be given precedent) rather than with larger ques-
tions of public policy. 
That Lewis Powell is a political conservative is clear. To put 
that conservatism in perspective, one should note the two conspicuous 
traditions in Southern politics. One is populism, calling to mind such 
colorful, sometimes circuslike figures as Huey Long and his cry of 
"Every Man a King" or Gene Talmadge and his red galluses. The 
other is Bourbonism, the genteel world in which so many Virginia 
political leaders, notably the late Senator Harry F. Byrd, have 
moved.13 One of the hallmarks of Southern Bourbonism is legalism, 
in particular, the instinct for responding to unwelcome political or 
social trends within a state or on the national scene by fashioning a 
constitutional framework for the Southern point of view. One may 
recall as instances the Southern turn-of-the-century state constitutions 
and the constitutional theorizing (including the short-lived revival of 
the doctrine of interposition) following Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.14 
Lewis Powell, as Fred Harris knew, is no populist. Rather, he may 
be identified with the Virginia of the Byrds; indeed, Powell 
served as a member of a five-man steering committee for the younger 
Byrd's campaign for re-election to the United States Senate in 1970. 
Powell, however, is the kind of conservative whose political philoso-
phy is visibly tempered by an acute sensitivity to public needs such 
as those in education; Powell, as a member of the commission that 
laid the groundwork for the adoption of Virginia's new Constitution, 
is well known to have been the father of the provisions which broke 
with the "pay-as-you-go" fiscal policy so closely associated with Byrd 
senior.15 But wherever he may stand on specific political issues, 
Powell is deeply imbued with the legalistic tradition of Southern 
thought. 
A commitment to the modes of legalism is in fact an idee fixe in 
the ideas and writings of Lewis Powell.16 The theme emerges in his 
strongly stated views on civil disobedience and his commitment to 
13. For a vivid picture of Virginia politics d la Byrd, see J. WILKINSON, HARRY BYRD 
AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VIRGINIA POLITICS, 1954-1966 (1968), 
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15. For the Commission's proposals, see THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 293-94, 307-19 (1969). For Powell's subsc• 
quent advocacy of the Commission's fiscal proposals, sec Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Feb. 25, 1969. 
16. I make no attempt here to attach any precise meaning to the term "legalism.'' 
I use the term to suggest an attitude; I do not use it to imply an ideology. 
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the use of legal avenues to redress grievances.17 It appears in his dis-
taste for judicial doctrines that seem to fetter law enforcement and 
crime detection.18 It is reflected in the fact that he chose to aspire to 
the presidency of that citadel of legalism, the American Bar Associa-
tion-and by the fact that his fellow lawyers bestowed that honor 
upon him. 
An English lawyer once remarked, "A man who has had a legal 
training is never quite the same again . . . . [He] is never able to 
look at institutions or administrative practices or even social or 
political policies, free from his legal habits of belief."19 This is not 
to say that legalism always takes the form of ideology; there are, after 
all, lawyers who are liberals or radicals, and those who are conserva-
tives or reactionaries. But, as has often been remarked, legalism tends 
to conservatism in the sense that law is a conserving force, one that 
looks to rules and accepted modes.20 No man has spent his life 
more squarely in this legalistic tradition than Lewis Powell, who 
comes to the Court, at age 64, with habits and attitudes that cannot 
fail but be shaped by conspicuous success and recognition at working 
within these accepted legal modes.21 
Powell does not, however, come to the Court with a fully worked-· 
out judicial philosophy. Indeed, in the Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings on his nomination, Powell observed that until recently he 
had not actually thought about a "judicial philosophy."22 This is 
not to say that Powell i~ without experience in and exposure to 
constitutional questions. He served with notable distinction as the 
chairman of the study commission that wrote Richmond's city 
charter23-an exercise in constitution-making-and more recently 
was a member of the Virginia constitutional revision commission.24 
And, as noted below, Powell has served on study groups, such as the 
17. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra. 
18. See text accompanying notes 46-59 infra. 
19. Griffith, The LAw of Property (Land), in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN 
THE 20TH CENTURY 118 (M. Ginsberg ed. 1959). 
20. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 10 (1964). 
21. Powell's legalism corresponds rather well to Schmidhauser's description of the 
Supreme Court, in its role as keeper of the American conscience over the years, as re-
flecting "essentially the conscience of the American upper middle-class sharpened by 
the imperative of individual social responsibility and political activism, and conditioned 
by the conservative impact of legal training and professional legal attitudes and associa-
tions." Schmidhauser, supra note 4, at 49. 
22. Hearings, supra note I, at 219. 
23. The Commission's report is a textbook model of lucidity. See RICHMOND CHAR• 
TER COMMISSION REPoRT (1947). 
24. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
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President's Crime Commission, in the course of which he has had 
occasion to formulate positions on specific topics such as the Miranda 
warnings.25 But it seems fair to say that Powell does not mount the 
bench with the kind of fully worked-out judicial philosophy which 
Felix Frankfurter so clearly brought with him to the bench20 and 
which it seems that William Rehnquist already carries with him. 
Powell and Rehnquist are both political conservatives; both may 
prove to be judicial conservatives. But there are notable differences 
in their style that may give rise to differences in judicial behavior. If 
Rehnquist's ideology is the more systematic and his thinking tends to 
the deductive, Powell leans to a pragmatic, problem-oriented style, a 
more inductive method of reasoning. Typically, his views on a sub-
ject have evolved from having had to think through that subject in 
the fashion of a lawyer dealing with a case. Powell's views on wire-
tapping, for example, derive not from abstract views of the matter, 
but rather from viewing evidence accumulated during an ABA 
project and the work of the National Crime Commission. 
Powell is by nature not one who volunteers his views on a subject 
-a trait which would naturally incline him to genuine judicial 
conservatism (for example, avoiding constitutional questions when a 
nonconstitutional ground of decision is available). Although Powell 
has written and spoken on many occasions, it is in character for him 
that these speeches and articles either arose out of his office, e.g., as 
ABA president, or had been solicited, e.g., the much-debated article 
on wiretapping which Powell was asked to write for the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch as a rebuttal to an earlier article in that newspaper.27 
Powell has the lawyer's trait of waiting for the client, case, or issue to 
come to him-perhaps a reflection of lawyerly sensitivity about 
solicitation, advertising, and self-publicity.28 Powell's caution about 
forming judgments is reflected by his characteristic, and totally 
candid, answer to some questions put during the Senate Judiciary 
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
26. See Sacks, Felix Frankfurter, in 3 Friedman 8: Israel, supra note 8, at 2401, 2406. 
Z,. See text accompanying note 61 infra. 
28. Rehnquist, by contrast, is a volunteer. When the Phoenix City Council was 
considering a public accommodations ordinance, Rehnquist appeared in person before 
the Council to oppose the measure. The text of the statement, made June 15, 1964, 
appears in Hearings, supra note 1, at 305. When the ordinance was adopted he wrote a 
strong letter to the Arizona Republic voicing continued opposition. The text of the 
letter appears in id. at 307. See also Rehnquist's 1967 letter to the Republic opposing 
proposals to break down de facto segregation in PhoenL'\'. schools. Id. at 309. In these 
acts, Rehnquist made it clear that he was simply representing his personal views. A 
man whose instincts call out so loudly for him to be vocal and activist on the political 
scene may carry those instincts with him to the Court. The differences- are perhaps, 
trivial, but it is hard to imagine Lewis Powell writing a letter to the editor. 
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Committee hearings: "I have never studied that"29 or " ... I have 
never considered this area.''30 
At the Judiciary Committee hearings, Powell did bring with him 
one prepared statement-his views on the "role of the Court." In 
his statement, he touched six points. They include (1) a belief in the 
separation of powers, that courts should not encroach on the pre-
rogatives of the legislative and executive branches; (2) a belief in 
the federal system; (3) an attitude of judicial restraint; (4) a respect 
for precedent, springing from a belief in the importance of continuity 
and predictability in the law; (5) the need to decide cases on the basis 
of law and fact before the Court; and (6) the responsibility of the 
Court to uphold the rule of law and to protect the liberties guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.31 
It is revealing that Powell's statement shows more concern with 
process than with results; all save the last of Powell's six points go to 
the Court's process, rather than to substantive issues. Moreover, in 
his statement Powell developed the first five points rather carefully, 
sometimes giving specific examples, whereas his treatment of the 
six.th point is summary. One may infer that Powell, like the judicial 
conservatives, has a special sensitivity to the integrity of the process, 
to certain canons and precepts that he would apply independently of 
their impact on substantive issues at stake in a case. 
The resemblance of Powell's stated views on the judicial process 
to the views of Felix Frankfurter and those of the second Justice 
Harlan is obvious. It was with an obvious touch of pride that, in out-
lining his views to the Judiciary Committee, Powell attributed his 
belief in the importance of judicial restraint to his having studied 
under Frankfurter at Harvard Law School.32 And to reinforce 
Powell's kinship with Harlan, it is interesting that Powell's first 
selection of a law clerk was a Virginia law student who has written 
admiringly of Justice Harlan and the values of federalism.33 
It is not given to many American Presidents to have the oppor-
tunity that events have thrust into the hands of Richard Nix.on to 
remake the face of the Supreme Court.34 And no President has laid 
29, Hearings, supra note 1, at 207. 
30. Id. at 218. 
31. Id. at 219. 
32. Id. 
33. J. Harvie Wilkinson III. See Wilkinson, Justice John M. Harlan and the Values 
of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REv. 1185 (1971). 
34. President Taft, in a little over two years, was able to put five men, Lurton, 
Hughes, Van Devanter, Joseph R. Lamar, and Pitney, on the Court, as well as name Ed-
ward Douglas White as Chief Justice. Warren Harding, in his two yea~ and five months in 
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down in more explicit terms the philosophical assumptions on which 
he has chosen his nominees.35 Some observers have suggested that, 
while the President speaks of judicial conservatism, the likely result 
will be a Court of judicial activists-conservative, to be sure, but ac-
tivist all the same. 
In recent decades, judicial activism has come in waves. Sometimes 
it has pursued conservative objectives, sometimes liberal. The Court's 
activism in the years before 1936 was conservative, overturning 
state and federal social welfare legislation. The activism of the late 
1950's and the 1960's, the years of the Warren Court, was liberal; it 
was concerned with the protection of the weak and the unpopular, 
such as criminal defendants, the disfranchised, and racial minorities. 
If the emerging Nixon majority on the Court does prove to be 
activist, the question then becomes, What form will that activism 
take? 
One possibility is put forth in the President's statement announc-
ing the Powell and Rehnquist appointments: redressing the balance 
between the "peace forces" in society and the "criminal forces." The 
obvious area in which to readjust that balance is in the criminal cases 
that come before the Court, especially those which raise questions 
under the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. And it is in just these 
areas that the impact of the first two Nixon appointments, of Chief 
Justice Burger and of Justice Blackmun, has already been most ap-
parent. 
Criminal Law. The fourth amendment decisions are suggestive. 
The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun have both indicated their 
disapproval of the exclusionary rule30-Burger lamenting the "mon-
strous price" we pay for that rule.37 Both Justices have joined in a 
course likely to lead to the undercutting or overruling of the 
Aguilar38 and Spinelli39 cases regarding the sufficiency of an in-
former's tip as the basis for a search warrant.40 Burger and Blackmun 
office, was able to put four men on the Court: Taft (as Chief Justice), Sutherland, 
Butler, and Sanford. 
35. Of course, selection of men thought to be committed to a President's values has 
been a recurring consideration in making Supreme Court nominations. See Schmid-
hauser, supra note 4, at 35. 
36. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, J., dis-
senting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492, 510 (1971) (Burger, J., dissent-
ing in part and coLcurring in part; Blackmun, J., joining parts of the opinion of 
Justice Black). 
37. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971). 
38. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
39. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
40. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). 
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made possible the majority holding that the fourth amendment is 
not violated by the use at trial of a recording made by an informer 
who records a conversation with the accused.41 
Equally suggestive of a marked change in the Court's course are 
recent decisions involving the fifth and sixth amendments. The 
much-debated Miranda decision has been a particular object of attack 
by critics of the Warren Court; Burger and Blackmun were part of 
the five-four majority in Harris v. New York,42 which narrowed Mi-
randa by holding that a statement which, under the Miranda stan-
dards, would be inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief 
may nevertheless be used to impeach the credibility of the defendant's 
testimony. In another case, Blackmun, in an opinion joined by 
Burger, wrote for the Court in holding that trial by jury is not re-
quired in juvenile proceedings.43 
In more than one case the Chief Justice has registered his ob-
jection to the Court's imposing uniform requirements on the 
states.44 And he has thrown out hints about the limits of his willing-
ness to abide decisions of the Warren Court when he has said that he 
"categorically" rejects the thesis "that what the Court said lately 
controls over the Constitution."45 
Lewis Powell has, on several occasions, voiced doubts about the 
extent to which the Supreme Court has gone in interpreting the 
rights of the a~cused in criminal cases. For example, he was one of 
four members of the National Crime Commission who, in an ad-
ditional statement to the Commission's 1967 Report, were critical of 
the Escobedo46 and Miranda decisions.47 On other occasions Powell 
41. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). See also Black's dissent (in which 
Burger joined) and Blackmun's dissent from the 6-3 holding in Whitely v. Warden, 401 
U.S. 560, 570, 575 (1971), that there were insufficient facts supporting the complaint on_ 
which an arrest had been made, and their dissents from the Court's holding in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 430 (1971), that damages may be 
inferred from a fourth amendment violation. Burger and Blackmun (the latter writing 
for the Court) made up part of the 6-3 majority in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 
(1971), upholding against fourth amendment claims home visitation as part of New 
York's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. 
42. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). For an example of an apparent willingness to get on with 
the job of reassessing the bounds of Miranda, see United States v. Dimas Campos• 
Serrano, 40 U.S.L.W. 4084, 4086 & n.l (U.S. Dec. 20, 1971) (Blackmun, Burger, and 
White, JJ ., dissenting). 
43. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
44. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (concurring opinion); Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U.S. 6G, 76-77 (1970) (dissenting opinion). 
45. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 21, 22 (1970) (dissenting opinion). 
46. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
47. PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF Juma, Tm: 
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has aired his concern that "[t]he pendulum may indeed have swung 
too far" in the effort to assure a fair trial for the accused.48 On each 
of these occasions, however, Powell has taken care to put his concern 
into a larger, and carefully balanced, perspective. The object, he has 
urged, is the "striking of a just and reasonable balance" in which 
"there must be no lessening of this concern for the constitutional 
rights of persons accused of a crime."49 And he has underscored the 
selectivity of his criticisms of particular cases by observing, "Many of 
the decisions of the Supreme Court which are criticized today are 
likely, in the perspective of history, to be viewed as significant mile-
stones in the ageless struggle to protect the individual from arbitrary 
or oppressive government."50 
There is no reason to think that Powell's views in the area of 
criminal justice are rigid. As a lawyer he had no criminal trial ex-
perience; the occasion for him to focus on this area came in the mid-
1960's, with his ABA presidency and his service on the National 
Crime Commission. At the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, 
Powell noted that he had not had recent occasion to restudy his 1966 
views on cases such as J.11:iranda and Escobedo;51 indeed, he showed 
his awareness of studies undercutting the fears he had expressed 
about the impact of those decisions on law enforcement.52 
It seems likely that Powell will be especially sensitive in cases 
involving access to the courts, e.g., right-to-counsel cases. This sensi-
tivity is a logical corollary of Powell's devotion to the principle of 
respect for law and his deep-seated concern about civil disobedience 
and civil disorder-a theme which he developed in the strongest 
terms in a number of speeches and articles before mounting the 
bench. 58 One who urges, as Powell has often done, that disputes be 
channeled into legal avenues ought to consider the extent to which 
those legal forums are freely available to all, regardless of race or 
economic status. It is instructive, therefore, to recall Powell's efforts 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 303-08 (1967) (additional views of Messrs. Jawor-
ski, Malone, Powell, and Storey). 
48. Powell, A.n Urgent Need: More Effective Criminal Justice, 51 A.B.A.J. 437, 439 
(1965). See also Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Pro• 
fession, 51 A.B.A.J. 821, 827 (1965); Powell, Civil Liberties Repression: Fact or Fiction1 
-"Law-A.biding Citizens Have Nothing To Fear," Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 1, 
1971, in Hearings, supra note 1, at,213. 
49. Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 51 
A.B.A.J. 821, 827 (1965). 
50. Powell, A.n Urgent Need: More Effective Criminal Justice, 51 A.B.A.J. 437, 439 
(1965). 
51. Hearings, supra note 1, at 237. 
52. Id. at 232. 
5~ •. See authorities cited, in 0notes, 78-79 infra. 
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as ABA president to make legal services more generally available. On 
the occasion of his nomination, lavish praise was heaped on Powell 
for the role he played in nurturing OEO's legal services program at 
a critical time in its early life.54 The symmetry of Powell's concern 
about civil disobedience and his quest for freer access to the courts 
bears an interesting resemblance to the views of Justice Black, whose 
opinions voiced such deep distress about civil unrest and who, at the 
same time, was such a champion of unfettered access to courts of 
justice.1i5 There is reason to expect a like symmetry in Powell's 
opinions. 
Powell has not given signs of wanting to embark on an across-the-
board cutback in recent case law applying Bill of Rights guarantees 
to the state criminal process. 56 However, the Court has already given 
unmistakable signs of reassessment of much existing doctrine, and 
from the Court's recent decisions and from Powell's statements one 
may glean important areas of likely agreement where pruning may 
be predicted. As recently as April 1971, in a speech to the Richmond 
Bar Association, Powell said that one way to fight organized crime 
would be to "relax some of the artificial rules engrafted upon the 
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments by divided votes of the Court in• 
cases like Miranda and Escobedo."51 And at the Judiciary Committee 
hearings, Powell said that he knew of "no reasons why at this time"· 
he should have views different from those he expressed as a member 
of the National Crime Commission (though he noted that he had not. 
studied some of the issues since that time).58 
Powell's votes in criminal cases will also be influenced by his views 
about federalism. He will be no more sympathetic than was Justice 
Harlan to the expansive use of habeas corpus to give collateral federal, 
review of state criminal convictions.59 But, all in all, Powell's state-
ments in the area of criminal procedure are not notably doctrinaire. 
54. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 125 (former Senator Joseph D. Tydings) 
127 (Orison S. Marden), 130 (Bernard G. Segal), 281 Gean Camper Cahn). 
55. See Howard, Mr. Justice Black: The Negro I:rotest Movement and the Rule of_ 
Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 1030 (1967). - . · · 
56. See, e.g., Powell's intimation that Griffin v. California, 380' U.S. 609 (1965) 
(forbidding comment on the failure of an accused to take the stand), which he had 
criticized as a member of the President's Crime Commission, might now be a precedent 
that he would leave undisturbed. Hearings, supra note I, at 227. · · • 
57. In id. at 246 n.2. Powell observed that the English courts "have few such rigid, 
artificial rules." Id. · · 
58. Id. at 237. 
59. Powell has indicated that, while postconvictiori review by federar habeas corpus 
may have been necessary at a time when state criminal procedure "had not really 
caught up with" existing constitutional requirements, a "better system" must now 
be devised. Id. at 286. Harlan's views on the subject are, of course, well known. See, 
e.g., his dissent in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 457 (1965). · 
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As a judge he is likely to be influenced by reasoned argument and to 
weigh closely the competing interests before deciding cases. 
Wiretapping. Liberals concerned about the Nixon nominees to 
the Court have voiced special doubts about their views on wire-
tapping. 60 Powell's wiretapping views were the subject of close 
scrutiny during the Judiciary Committee's hearings, especially be-
cause of an article that Powell had written for the Richmond Times-
Dispatch, in which he dismissed the outcry over wiretapping as a 
"tempest in a teapot." Citing figures on the number of wiretaps 
annually, Powell concluded, "Law-abiding citizens have nothing to 
fear."61 
Pending before the Court is the question of the President's power 
to authorize wiretaps without judicial supervision in cases involving 
internal security.62 If Powell's Times-Dispatch article be taken as a 
gauge of his thinking, he is obviously disposed to the view that the 
President should have that power. It is not so clear, however, that 
that article represents his full and considered judgment. The article, 
a journalistic piece, was solicited as a rebuttal to an article expres-
sing the opposite point of view.63 Powell's Times-Dispatch article 
ought to be compared with the views in a speech he gave to the 
Richmond Bar Association.64 There he took a much more guarded 
and tentative position on taps in internal security cases. Given the 
inherent difference between journalism (especially by one who is 
not a journalist) and legal writing, the bar speech, made to a legal 
audience, may well be the better measure of the manner in which 
Powell, as a Justice, will approach wiretapping cases. It is one thing 
to write an article for a newspaper, quite another, after briefs and 
arguments, to make law. 
All in all, however, it would be surprising if Powell were moved 
to shift markedly from his stated views on wiretaps in domestic 
security cases. The distinction between "external" and "internal" 
threats· to national security-which he labeled "largely meaningless" 
in his Times-Dispatch article65-Powell in the Richmond Bar speech 
still called "far less meaningful now that radical organizations openly 
60. See, e.g., Lewin, Lewis Powell's Confusion: Facts About Wiretapping, THE 
NEW R.EPUBUC, Nov. 20, 1971, at 16. 
61. Powell, Civil Liberties Repression: Fact or Fiction1, in Hearings, supra note I, 
at 213, 215. 
62. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 444 F,2d 
651 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 930 (1971). 
63. Gavzer, ls Individual Freedom Threatened by Growth of Government Probes1, 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 6, 1971, § F, at l, col. I. 
64. Address of April 15, 1971, in Hearings, supra note I, at 244. 
65. Id. at 214. 
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advocate violence."66 In the Judiciary Committee hearings, while 
noting that he had no "fixed views," Powell continued to refer to the 
"hazy" area of national security and internal security.67 Even if he 
decides that the issue of the President's inherent power to wiretap in 
"internal security" (as opposed to "national security") cases must be 
resolved against the President, Powell's notion of "national security" 
could still be a sweeping one, including not merely domestic sub-
versives working actively with foreign powers but also those "sympa-
thetic" to such powers. 68 
In general, while making clear his opposition to "indiscriminate" 
use of wiretapping, Powell summed up his views rather succinctly in 
his testimony: 
I remember very well Mr. Justice Holmes' shorthand way of dis-
posing of it. He said: "Wiretapping is dirty business." Of course, 
it is dirty business. The public interest, on the other hand, is to try 
to protect the innocent people from business that is equally dirty 
and in many instances dirtier.69 
Race and civil rights. The turnaround of the post-Warren Court 
in criminal cases is not paralleled in civil rights decisions.7° For 
proof one need only point to the decision of Chief Justice Burger, 
who wrote for a unanimous Court in upholding a district court's use 
of busing, racial quotas, and other devices to achieve a racially 
unitary school system,71 as well as to the companion case (invalidating 
North Carolina's antibusing law) holding that race must be con-
sidered in fashioning judicial remedies to end racial discrimination 
in public schools.72 The Burger Court has likewise been generous in 
its construction of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196473 and of 
Congress' power under the thirteenth amendment to reach private 
conspiracies. 74 
Lewis Powell's record on race and civil rights was called into ques-
tion at his confirmation hearings during the testimony of Representa-
tive Conyers of Michigan, speaking for the Black Congressional 
66. Id. at 247. 
67. Id. at 212. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 275. 
70. Vernon Jordan, the executive director of the Urban League, sees things differ-
ently. He has said that blacks cannot take comfort in the chant of the 1960's, "Ain't 
gonna let nobody turn us round," because "when they see the new Supreme Court, 
they'll know we've been turned around." Washington Post, Jan. 6, 19i2, at Al6, col. 5. 
71. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). 
72. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971). 
73. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
74. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
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Caucus, and of a Richmond attorney, representing the black Old· 
Dominion Bar Association. These witnesses submitted that Powell, 
as chairman of the Richmond School Board, had frustrated desegrega-
tion of that city's schools, and that the record showed other instances 
in Powell's public, professional, and private life of his hostility or 
indifference to black aspirations.75 Other witnesses, including the 
leading NAACP attorney in Virginia in the 1950's and the first 
black member of Richmond's school board, have painted a different 
picture.76 
Powell's statements and actions furnish a clue to how he may 
behave when racial cases come before the Court. There is little doubt 
how he feels about sit-ins, demonstrations, and other acts of civil 
disobedience. When the civil rights movement of the 1960's was at 
its height, Powell criticized the "heresy" of civil disobedience77 and 
condemned it as one of the "contributing causes" to the trend 
"toward organized lawlessness and even rebellion.''78 At the same 
time Powell made equally clear how he feels about legislatures and 
public officials who attempt to disobey or evade court-ordered integra-
tion.79 To Powell the "rule of law" binds white officialdom as it does 
black civil rights activists. And Powell has shown his awareness of 
the abuses of the legal process, double standards of justice, and 
· other forms of discrimination and intimidation which so often gave 
the black ample reason not to respect the law.80 
Powell's role as Richmond School Board Chairman following 
Brown v. Board of Education is especially revealing. In the face of the 
public hostility to integration that had resulted in the closing of 
public schools in several Virginia communities, Powell pursued one 
75. Hearings, supra note 1, at 361-95. 
76. Oliver W. Hill, the NAACP attorney (and also the first black member of the 
Richmond City Council under the 1948 Charter), submitted to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee a statement calling Powell "a progressive moderate on racial questions" 
and praising Powell's contributions to the progressive features of the new Virginia 
Constitution. Manuscript statement, Nov. 4, 1971. (By apparent inadvertence Hill'n 
statement does not appear in the printed record of the Committee's hearings.) Booker 
T. Bradshaw, a black school board member during the time of Powell's chairmanship, 
has recalled the "vital part [Powell] played in opposing 'massive resistance,' keeping 
the Richmond Public Schools open and ultimately bringing about the integration of 
the schools." Letter to Senator William B. Spong, Jr., Nov. 12, 1971. See also note 82 
infra and accompanying text. 
77. Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH, 8: LEE L. REV. 205 (1966), 
78. Powell, Civil Disobedience: Prelude to Revolution?, 40 N.Y. ST. B.J. 172 (1968), 
79. See Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. 8: LEE L. REV. 
205, 210 (1966); Powell, Respect for Law and Due Process-The Foundation of a Free 
Society, IS U. FLA. L. REV. I, 4 (1965); Powell, The President's Annual Address: The 
State of the Legal Profession, 51 A.B.A.J. 821, 827 (1965). 
80. Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. 8e LEE L. REV. 205, 
206 (1966). 
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overriding goal: keeping the Richmond schools open while the clash 
between court decrees and state law resolved itself. Speaking for the 
Richmond board, Powell visualized the "catastrophic effect" of 
closing schools, including the "warping and corrosive" effect on 
individual children. Private schools, he argued, were no alternative 
because only the well-to-do could afford them and the burden of 
closed schools would fall on those less fortunate. 81 
Perhaps the most compelling portrait of Lewis Powell's attitudes 
to the needs and aspirations of the black in America has been painted 
by Jean Camper Cahn, a black woman who dealt with Powell when 
OEO's legal services program was getting underway. Candid about 
the "misgivings" which she felt in working with "a white lawyer from 
the ranks of Southern aristocracy leading the then lily-white ABA,"82 
Mrs. Cahn described to the Judicary Committee Powell's "capacity 
to empathize, to respond to the plight of a single human being to a 
degree that transcends ideologies or fixed positions"-a quality of 
humanity which Mrs. Cahn thought essential in the Court of last 
resort "to which I and my people so frequently must tum as the sole 
forum" for redress of grievances. 83 
First amendment. The lines drawn by the Supreme Court in 
first amendment cases have always been wavering and uncertain ones, 
and it is no easier to say where the emerging Nixon majority is 
headed in this respect than to sum up where the Court stood at any 
earlier juncture. On the one hand, the first two Nixon appointees to 
81. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 7, 1959. The difficult climate of opinion in 
which Powell had to work is suggested by the 1956 call of a Richmond City coun-
cilman, an ardent opponent of desegregation, for Powell to disclose his own per-
sonal views on desegregation before Council acted to reappoint Powell to the School 
Board; the councilman obviously doubted Powell's willingness to man the barricades 
in support of segregation. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 12, 1956. The difficulty of 
second-guessing, years after the fact, Powell's efforts to maintain a moderate course 
through troubled waters was evident to Senator Hart, of Michigan, who, with obvious 
reference to his own constituents' unrest over busing to achieve school desegregation, 
told the Senate: 
I understand more clearly now than I might have had a year ago just how 
intense the pressure is when a community is required to correct a school system 
found to be segregated as a result of public policy, or de jure. 
Mr. Lewis Powell stood up to that pressure. He took the right course-comply 
with the requirement of the Constitution and law; he rejected the popular 
course-close the schools. He has my respect and vote. 
117 CONG. REc. s. 20589 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1971). 
With respect to the more recent issue of school busing and neighborhood schools, 
it might be noted that Powell signed the Commonwealth of Virginia's amicus brief 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). See 402 U.S. at 4. 
82. Letter from Jean Camper Cahn, Director of Urban Law Institute of Antioch 
College, to Senator James 0. Eastland, Nov. 3, 1971, in Hearings, supra note 1, at 281. 
Mrs. Cahn's letter, which should be read in full, is one of the most eloquent documents 
ever submitted in testimony on a Supreme Court nominee. 
83. Id. at 285. 
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the Court have joined in further expanding in several libel cases the 
application of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule,84 and the 
Chief Justice, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote the Court's opinion 
striking down salary supplements and other forms of state aid to 
sectarian schools. 85 On the other hand, the two Justices have consis-
tently rejected first amendment attacks on state bar admission re-
quirements, 86 they have been readier than some of their colleagues to 
uphold antiobscenity statutes,87 and they have dissented from hold-
ings invalidating a city ordinance regarding assembling on sidewalks88 
and overturning a state conviction for the public display of a four-
letter word.89 In the Pentagon Papers case, both Burger and Black-
mun, in the Frankfurterian tradition, took pains to reject an 
"absolute" view of the first amendment, and both Justices (with 
Harlan) indicated the broad deference they would give the executive 
branch in deciding when disclosure of secret information would 
adversely affect national security.00 
Lewis Powell has not taken many occasions to express himself 
directly on rights of freedom of expression. He has taken a close look 
at the question of fair trial and free press, and his accommodation of 
those rights reflects a sensitivity to what he calls the "privileged 
position" of freedom of speech and press in the United States. He 
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971): 
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 
401 U.S. 265 (1971). See also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672 (1971), upholding federal construction grants to both religious and nonsectarian 
colleges. 
86. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, II (1971) (Blackmun, Burger, Harlan, and White, 
JJ., dissenting); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 
U.S. 154 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 31 (1971) (Blackmun, Burger, Harlan, and 
White, JJ ., dissenting). 
87. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States 
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). But see Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), which both 
Burger and Blackmun joined, holding that the administrative censorship scheme 
created by 39 U.S.C. §§ 4006-07 (1970), failed to meet the standards laid down by 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), and therefore violated the first amendment. 
88. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971) (Blackmun, Burger, and 
White, JJ., dissenting). 
89. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Black, Blackmun, and Burger, JJ., 
dissenting). 
90. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 748, 749 (Burger, J., dis• 
senting), 752, 756-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 759, 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1971). 
See also the Court's decisions markedly limiting the bounds of its 1965 ruling in 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), which had carried the potential of broad 
federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings in which a state law was 
challenged on first amendment grounds. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971): Samuels 
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 
401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) {per curiam): Bryne v. Karalexis, 
401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam). 
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rejects the British approach of reaching the media through the use of 
the contempt power; instead he emphasizes the duty of the bar to 
police itself and to reach at the source information that might 
prejudice a trial.91 Powell's oft-stated concern about civil dis-
obedience suggests that as a judge he would draw a rather sharp line 
between speech, which is protected by the first amendment, and 
conduct, which is not. His views on direct action bear a marked 
resemblance to those of Justice Black in the sit-in and demonstration 
cases of the 1960's.92 Indeed, Powell has often quoted from those 
Black opinions.93 It is apparent that Powell, like Black, would reject 
first amendment arguments such as those of Justice Fortas in Brown 
v. Louisiana94 and that Powell would not likely be a hearty advocate 
of Harry Kalven's concept of the "public forum," which emphasizes 
the speech component of mixed speech and conduct in public 
places.05 Powell, like Black, has returned again and again to the 
theme of the rule of law and the settlement of disputes through 
orderly legal processes. The debt to Black is obvious in such state-
ments of Powell as: 
And here, as a lawyer, may I emphasize that the right of dissent 
is surely a vital part of our American heritage. So also are the rights 
to assembly, to petition and to test the validity of challenged laws 
or regulations. But our constitution and tradition contemplate the 
orderly assertion of these rights. There is no place in our system for 
vigilantism or the lawless instrument of the mob.96 
In first amendment cases Lewis Powell is likely to be a "balancer" 
in the classic Frankfurterian tradition-though, of course, every 
"balancer" brings to the calculus his own appraisal of the various 
interests at stake. Nothing is more characteristic of Powell's approach 
91. Powell, The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534, 535-36 (1965); Powell, 
The President's Page, 51 A.B.A.J. 199 (1965). See also Powell, The President's Annual 
Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 51 A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1965). For further 
evidence of Powell's concern about the contempt power, see Powell, Jury Trial of 
Crimes, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1966). 
92. See, e.g., Black's opinions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (dissenting 
opinion); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 575 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 
39 (1966). For an analysis of Black's views in those cases, see Howard, supra note 55. 
93. See Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 
51 A.B.A.J. 821, 827-28 (1965); Powell, Respect for Law and Due Process-The Founda-
tion of a Free Society, 18 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. I, 7-8 n.18 (1965); Powell, A Lawyer Looks 
at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 205, 226-27, 231 (1966); Powell, Civil 
Disobedience: Prelude to Revolution?, 40 N.Y. ST. B.J. 172, 173 (1968). 
94. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
95. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Form: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
96. Powell, Respect for Law and Due Process-The Foundation of a Free Society, 
18 U. Fu. L REv. I, 7 (1965). 
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to a problem (first amendment or otherwise) than to talk of "the 
striking of a just and reasonable balance" between rights or inter-
ests, 97 or to seek the fullest accommodation of competing interests 
rather than to see them as antagonistic.98 Powell's whole temperament 
is that of the moderate man who prefers reason and reflection to 
emotion and impulse. He is a prudent and thoughtful man for whom 
the uses of "balancing" as understood in Supreme Court cases will 
hold a natural appeal. 
If Powell does "balance" in first amendment cases, it remains to 
be seen how that balance may be affected by his view of the separation 
of powers, of federalism, and of judicial self-restraint. After a visit to 
the Soviet Union in 1958, Powell spoke on many occasions of the 
need to educate Americans to the menace of Communism,00 and he 
spearheaded efforts in the ABA and in Virginia to have the study of 
Communism-"the overriding problem of our age"100-included in 
school curricula.101 Given such views, Powell might, when a case 
before the Court involved Communist or other subversion, be in-
clined to pay the kind of judicial deference to legislative judgment 
which characterized Justice Frankfurter's opinions in such cases as 
Dennis v. United States102 and Communist Party v. Subversive 
Activities Control Board.103 How far such deference, if any, might 
carry over to the Government's attitude toward internal security is 
97. Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 51 
A.B.A.J. 821, 827 (1965) (rights of the accused versus protection of the citizen from 
crime). 
98. E.g., Powell, The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534, 535 (1965) (fair trial 
and free press). 
99. See, e.g., Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 24, 1958; id., Nov, 13, 1958. 
100. Richmond News Leader, Sept. 21, 1960. 
IOI. Powell proposed that the ABA back the study of Communism in schools to 
contrast "the merits of freedom of Western democracy and 20th century capitalism 
and the brutal and repressive characteristics of 'dictatorship of the proletariat.'" 
Richmond News Leader, Aug. 30, 1960, See also Richmond News Leader, Sept. 21, 
1960 (pilot course in Communism in Richmond schools); Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Jan. 4, 1961 (proposal for Virginia schools); Richmond News Leader, Feb. 2, 1962 
(distribution of ABA handbook for instruction on Communism). In April 1961, Powell 
urged the United States to give "whatever aid and assistance may be necessary" to 
overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 20, 1961. See 
also the views of the Communist menace expressed in the Supplemental Statement 
(Sept. 30, 1970), which Powell signed, to the REPORT OF THE PRF.SIDENT'S BLUE R.lDDON 
DEFENSE PANEL (1970). 
102. Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we arc not 
legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to reconcile 
competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike is a 
judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless outside the pale 
of fair judgment. 
841 U.S. 494,517, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., -concurring). 
103. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
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a relevant question in light of Powell's hesitation, in the case of 
wiretapping, to draw a line between national defense and espionage 
by a foreign power on the one hand, and internal security by domestic 
radicals on the other.104 
At the same time, in deciding where the "balance" is to be struck 
in first amendment cases, Powell's judgment is likely also to be 
affected by his perception of the relation of freedom of expression to 
the use of orderly processes to achieve social and political change.105 
Powell might share the concern of Justice Douglas (perhaps among 
the few things the Justices will have in common) that actions of the 
state not result in alienation of individuals from the state, a concern 
that naturally would lead to a full reading of the first amendment as 
.a prerequisite of an open society.106 And one should recall the 
first amendment opinions of the conservative Justice Harlan,107 whom 
Powell resembles in so many other respects. 
Other areas. Even at this early date one perceives some of the di-
rections in which the emerging Nixon majority is embarking. In ad-
dition to what has been said above about criminal cases, the first 
amendment, and civil rights, a few other indicators may be men-
tioned. The Nixon appointees to the Court will be less likely than 
some of their colleagues to experiment with the "new" uses of the 
equal protection clause,108 although it is interesting, in light of the 
general trend of the Court's decisions in criminal cases, to note sev-
eral decisions in which the Court has used the equal protection 
clause to overturn additional jail sentences imposed on prisoners 
unable to pay fines109 and to require a state to make available to 
indigent prisoners additional legal research materials.110 Surely, how-
104. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra. 
105. Cf. Chief Justice Hughes' statement in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 
(1937): 
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to 
the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is 
the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press 
and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, 
to the end that government may be responsible to the will of the people and that 
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. 
106. On alienation as a central theme in the opinions of Douglas, see Way, The 
Study of Judicial Attitudes: The Case of Mr. Justice Douglas, 24 WESTERN POL. Q. 12, 
20 (1971). On a like theme running through the jurisprudence of Justice Black, see 
Howard, supra note 55. 
107. E.g., Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (concurring opinion); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958) (landmark right-of-association case). 
108. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1971), distinguishing Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
109. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
110. Younger v. Gilmore, 40 U.S.L.W. 4003 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1971). See also Meyer v. 
City of Chicago, 40 U.SL.W. 4055 (U.S. Dec. 1~ 1971), in which a unanimous Court 
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ever, in future equal protection opinions we shall see more talk of 
"rational basis" and less of "inherently suspect" classification.111 It 
is true that Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, 
ruled that a state statute giving preference to men over women in ap-
pointment as administrator of a decedent's estate violated the equal 
protection clause,112 but it is noteworthy that the decision rests 
squarely on the traditional "rational basis" test and does not intimate 
that sex, like race, might be an "inherently suspect" classification. 
Like the Court's conservatives of earlier years, the emerging majority 
may be more willing to put the due process clause to work113 than to 
experiment with equal protection, but one should not expect inno-
vations on the order of Griswold114 and its "penumbra" to come out 
of the Court.115 
In the area of representation and the franchise, the new majority 
is not likely to seek the overturn of such landmarks as Reynolds v. 
Sims,116 but Burger and Blackmun so far have shown much more 
readiness to allow deviations from strict majoritarianism than have 
some of·the holdovers from the Warren Court. Both Justices joined 
the opinion allowing a population deviation of 11.9% in a county 
government apportionment plan,117 both agreed that multimember 
legislative districts are not per se invalid,118 the Chief Justice wrote 
for the Court (in an opinion joined by Blackmun) in uphold-
ing a state requirement of an extraordinary majority in certain 
bond referenda,11° and Burger dissented (Blackmun taking no part) 
from the Court's ruling that a state may not restrict the vote to real 
property taxpayers in elections to approve the issuance of general 
held that a state, in complying with the rule that it must provide an indigent appellant 
with a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of his claims, 
may not distinguish between felony and nonfelony convictions, 
III. See Richardson v. Belcher, 40 U.S.L.W. 4015 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971) (reduction 
in social security benefits); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state's dollar 
limit on welfare benefits to any one family). Marshall dissented in both cases, arguing 
that a "rational basis" test has no place in cases involving fundamental services or 
basic human needs. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4018, 4019; 397 U.S. at 508, 519·22, 
Il2. Reed v. Reed, 40 U.S.L.W. 4013 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1971). 
113. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), holding that a state 
denies due process of law when it refuses access to a divorce court to an indigent 
unable to pay court fees and costs. 
114. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
II5. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), upholding a District of Columbia 
abortion statute against vagueness attacks; the Court passed up the invitation to 
reach arguments based on Griswold. 
Il6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
117. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). 
ll8. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
II9. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), 
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obligation bonds.120 Burger and Blackmun were among the four 
Justices who, in reviewing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, would have ruled that Congress lacked the constitutional power 
to extend the vote to eighteen-year olds even in federal elections.121 
From the overt record, we know less of what Lewis Powell thinks 
of such matters as franchise and representation, of the "vague con-
tours" of the due process clause, and of the "new" uses of equal pro-
tection, than we know of his views in such areas as the rights of an 
accused in a criminal case. But we do know something of his attitude 
to the role of the Court as a part of the federal system and as one of 
the three coordinate branches of government. And we know some-
thing of his belief in judicial self-restraint. Without attempting to 
predict his decision in specific cases, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that he will be much of a mind with the late Justice Harlan in being 
wary of an activist judicial role in imposing majoritarian philosophy 
upon the states or the federal government, or in discovering new "fun-
damental" rights entitled to a higher than normal insulation from 
legislative judgments. 
Powell, attuned to traditional legal analysis, is likely to be the 
judicial antithesis of a Justice Douglas in dealing with the social con-
tours of due process and equal protection problems. The style of the 
two men's writing is suggestive. A Douglas opinion cites sources, 
legal and nonlegal, which are as far-ranging as the travels of the man 
himself.122 By contrast, one searches the typical Powell article or 
speech in vain for the use of nonlegal authorities to support a legal 
argument. A Powell opinion is not apt to have sociological footnotes 
like that which occasioned so much comment after Brown v. Board of 
Education.123 
It may be true, as some liberals insist, that the emerging Nixon 
majority on the Court will be activist.124 Conservatives might argue 
120. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 215 (1970) (dissenting opinion). 
121. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 281 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
122. See, e.g., Douglas's opinion arguing that the racial composition of New York's 
17th and 18th congressional districts was comparable to the Electoral Register System 
in British India and the Constitution of Cyprus. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 
59, 63 n.5, 65 n.10 (1964) (dissenting opinion). 
123. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). That footnote, relying on the findings of Gunnar 
Myrdal and other social scientists, gave rise to a countermovement: the effort to invoke 
science and social science in defense of racial segregation. See I. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO 
THE COURT (1967). 
124. Soon after William Rehnquist's nomination, Fred P. Graham gave his opinion 
that Rehnquist "is far from a strict constructionist. Instead, he is that type of judicial 
activist that Justice Warren was-except that Mr. Rehnquist believes that it is time 
to read conservative rather than liberal meanings into the Constitution." N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 3, 1971, at 27, col. 1. 
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that, rather than being "activist," what the Court will be doing is to 
withdraw from some areas, such as Miranda, into which the Warren 
Court moved, and to resist expanding the Court's scope of review 
in areas which the Court in the 1960's might have seemed readier to 
enter, such as the "new" equal protection. By such an argument, 
"activism" consists in the Court's striking down measures (liberal 
or conservative) of which the Court disapproves, whereas staying out 
of an area, or withdrawing from an area previously entered by the 
Court, would be judicial conservatism. 
Give its direction what label you will-"activist" or "strict con-
structionist" or otherwise-the emerging Nixon majority is already 
striking out on paths divergent from those of the Warren years. Sum-
ming up the 1970 Term of the Court, Harry Kalven was more impres-
sed by the continuities between the Warren and Burger Courts than 
by the discontinuities.125 But if one looks, not to the results reached 
by the entire Court, but specifically at the votes and views of the first 
two Nixon appointees (as I have done only summarily and illustra-
tively in this Comment), the discontinuities become more evident. 
Add to the equation two more Nixon appointees-and assume the 
four at least tending to vote together126-and the evidence mounts 
that on a range of fronts there will be palpable breaks with the direc-
125. Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term; Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at 
War-, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 4-5 (1971). After the departure of Justices Harlan and 
Black from the Court, Kalven added a note at the outset of his article: "Rereading 
it now with hindsight, I would qualify its note of cautious optimism.'' Id. at 3 n. 
After the present Comment had been written, the 1971 SUPREME COURT REv1EW 
appeared carrying Philip B. Kurland's assessment of the Court's 1970 Term: 
The 1970 Term of the Supreme Court revealed that a new day has dawned in 
constitutional jurisprudence. The aftermath of the 1970 Term-the departures of 
Justices Black and Harlan and the appointments of their successors-now assures 
the change. The light of that new day, however, was not yet strong enough to 
illuminate the contours of the emerging doctrines-if any-that will guide the 
newly constituted tribunal. It is sufficiently clear, however, that many of the 
Warren Court's prevailing attitudes are no longer dominant. • • • Nor has the 
change as yet been as pervasive as some mourners for the immediate past would 
have it. 
Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 
265. 
126. If Powell and Rehnquist do, from the very outset, vote regularly with Burger 
and Blackmun, this course of events will run counter to the tendency, reported in a 
1958 study, of newly appointed Justices to join the subgroup holding the balance of 
power on the Court, and later to gravitate to the right or left. See Snyder, The Supreme 
Court as a Small Group, 36 SocIAL FORCES 232, 237 (1958). In the 1970 Term, the 
pivotal subgroup consisted of Harlan, Stewart, and White, not Burger and Blackmun. 
See Kalven, supra note 125, at 9. 
As if to underscore the hazards of the Supreme Court-watcher, Powell, in his first 
recorded dissent, joined, not the other Nixon appointees, but rather Douglas, Brennan, 
and White. See Lippitt v. Cipollone, 40 U.S.L.W. 3334, 3335 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1972). This 
is another caveat. to those who are too quick to assume they can predict judicial 
behavior. 
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tions of the Warren Court.127·.Even Powell, for.all his dedication to 
precedent, has been just as ready as Rehnquist to concede that the 
presumption attaching to precedent is weaker with more recent cases 
decided by a closely divided Court.128 Many important decisions of 
the Warren Court fall in this category. 
Such breaks with the past are bound to occasion great outcries 
from those who liked what the Warren Court was doing-just as the 
new ground broken by the Warren Court provoked protests from 
other quarters.129 Such shifts, whether by the Warren Court or by the 
Burger Court, further undermine the Court's mystique and increase 
the tensions to which the Court as an institution is subject. It be-
comes, therefore, all the more important that the new results be 
articulated in the most reasoned fashion.130 
It is in supplying such reasoned opinions that Le·wis Powell may 
provide his best service to the Court. It will be no surprise if he joins 
his vote with those of the other three Nixon nominees in shaping a 
new course for the Court. But if he writes the lucid, well-drafted 
opinions which many expect of him, then the thought reflected in 
those opinions should tend to mute legal and popular criticism-just 
as Powell was spared any substantial antagonism during his confir-
mation hearings, even from those who pointedly disagreed with the 
philosophy that led the President to nominate him. 
There are those who, with the ebb and flow of judicial decision, 
127. A conservative columist, James Jackson Kilpatrick, surveyed twenty constitutional 
cases decided by a 5-4 vote in the 1970 Term; casting his analysis in straight-cut 
conservative-liberal terms, Kilpatrick produced a scorecard showing that the "Court 
conservatives won thirteen, lost six, and emerged from U.S. v. Arizona with a tie." 
Kilpatrick, The High Court-Where Now?, 23 NATIONAL REVIEW 1287, 1288 (1971). 
128. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 19 (Rehnquist), 220 (Powell). 
129. For a criticism of what the authors see as cloudy logic and lack of judicial 
restraint by the Burger Court, see Dershowitz &: Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious 
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 
1198 (1971). The authors conclude that Harris reflects an impulse to reverse many of 
the Warren Court's holdings "with something more than deliberate speed." Id. at 1227. 
130. Philip B. Kurland is not very optimistic. Noting the departure of Justices 
Black and Harlan, Kurland observes: 
No matter who the replacements, the Supreme Court is likely to be a sadly 
debilitated institution for some time to come. For history has made it clear that 
great Justices are made not born; that experience on the Supreme Court itself 
is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for judicial eminence; that it takes 
time for any new appointee, however vast his prior judicial experience, to meet 
the extraordinary challenges that inhere in the job. 
The Court, then, would seem to be moving into a condition unfortunately 
similar to that which resulted when the Roosevelt Court under Stone was trans-
muted into the Truman Court under Vinson. Indeed, conditions are worse. For 
during the Truman period the Court had the strengths of Hugo Black, and Felix 
Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson. There is none left behind on the Court after 
the departure of Black and Harlan to carry out the same traditions of greatness. 
Kurland, supra note 125, at 320-21. 
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call, in the words of Herbert Wechsler, for "genuinely principled" 
decision-making, "reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite 
transcending the immediate result that is achieved."131 Lewis Powell's 
legalism should make that Wechslerian ideal attractive to him as a 
judge. 
One of the most principled of Justices, John Marshall Harlan, 
wrote on the occasion of Felix Frankfurter's retirement from the 
Court that Frankfurter 
brought to bear on his judgments a deep understanding of the 
nature and values of our federalism; a scrupulous observance of the 
boundaries between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
of the government; a dispassionate approach to the conflicting forces 
always present in a dynamic economy, and a sensitive regard for 
the balance that must ever be achieved in a free society between in-
dividual rights and governmental power.132 
Lewis Powell has yet to write the opinions by which his place 
among the Justices of the Supreme Court will be measured. But one 
can imagine his taking Harlan's judgment of Frankfurter as a worthy 
goal for himself. 
On the personal side, Powell's work habits and temperament-
conscientiousness, thoroughness, craftsmanship, and sheer capacity 
for hard work-are strikingly like Harlan's.133 As to philosophy, we 
may see time bearing out the resemblances that Powell's legalism 
bears to the qualities which were honored in Frankfurter and Har-
lan. If Powell joins a new majority in developing distinctive avenues 
of jurisprudence, he brings with him to the Court the tools by which 
to give reasoned and lucid voice to those avenues. 
131. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 
I, 15 (1959). 
132. Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 76 HARV. L. REv. 
I, 2 (1962). 
133. Many of the biographical similarities between Harlan and Powell are striking, 
Harlan drank deeply of the English legal tradition while a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford; 
Powell is a devout Anglophile. Harlan practiced with a law firm that did not dis• 
courage public service; lawyers in Powell's law firm (especially Powell himself) have 
been notably active in Virginia's public life (though not in elective office). Both 
Harlan and Powell had a practice of unusual range and complexity. Both served 
with distinction in World War II. Each man had particular occasion to engage himself 
in the problem of organized crime, Harlan as chief counsel for the New York State Crime 
Commission, Powell as a member of the subcommittee on organized crime of the 
President's Crime Commission. Both Harlan and Powell attained a number of bar 
association offices. For a biographical sketch of Harlan, see Dorsen, John Marshall 
Harlan, in 4 Friedman & Israel, supra note 8, at 2803. On Harlan's judicial views, sec 
THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY! SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF Jusm:E 
JOHN M. HARLAN (D. Shapiro ed. 1969). 
